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Abstract We study the impact of spectrum auction design on the prices paid by
telecommunications operators for two decades across 85 countries. Our empirical
strategy combines information about competition in the local market, the level of
adoption and a wide range of socio-economic indicators and process specific vari-
ables. Using a micro dataset of almost every mobile spectrum auction performed so
far—both regional and national—we show that auction design affects final prices paid.
Two designs (SMRA with augmented switching and CCA with core pricing) result
in auctions with systematically higher normalized returns. Further, we document that
spectrum ownership appears to affect prices paid in subsequent auctions. We discuss
the mechanisms of cost minimization and foreclosure faced by operators in differ-
ent regulatory environments. Our findings have implications for policy-makers and
regulators.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are mechanisms that help allocate resources to those that can use them most
valuably. Numerous economic transactions are conducted through auctions including
treasury bills, foreign exchange, assets under privatization, mineral and spectrum rights
among others (Klemperer 1999; Binmore and Klemperer 2002, Salant 2014). The
local market conditions, the types of goods auctioned and the priorities faced by the
government help shape the overall allocation mechanism and the specific rules of
the process. For example spectrum rights represent contracts on rivalrous and scarce
natural resources where operators are granted exclusive rights in a band of airwaves1
for a specified period of time. In cases where scarce goods under public control are
auctioned, regulators and antitrust agencies try to prevent collusive, predatory and
entry-deterring behaviors while maximizing the social gains.
Auction design, rules and regulatory requirements have been central to the political
debate for decades. The rapid adoption of mobile communications and digital technolo-
gies has rendered a previously underutilized natural resource—the electromagnetic
spectrum—a commodity of major importance. To this end a range of spectrum allo-
cation processes have been used by policy makers in an attempt to maximize the
economic and social returns to the local and national economies. The literature sug-
gests that various allocation methods ranging from administrative awards and beauty
contests to alternative auction designs, lead to different levels of normalized social
returns for the resource in question (Cramton 2013).2
Despite the progress in developing auction mechanisms, auction design “is not ‘one
size fits all’ and must be sensitive to the details of the context” (Klemperer 2002a).
The context represents the specific market structure and prospects, the regulatory
constraints and the overall economic environment in which firms operate. Auction
outcomes are affected by less obvious parameters, for example a bidder may feel the
thrill of a win over and above her value of receiving the object (Roider and Schmitz
2012). The disclosure of feedback is another novel instrument in design mechanisms
resulting in higher revenues (Jehiel 2011). Reserve price levels, the use of absolute
auctions (without a minimum price) bid floor or ceiling levels, public or secret reserve
prices or even the threat of cancellation have been found to affect outcomes too (Gavi-
ous et al. 2002; Che and Gale 1998; Chen and Chiu 2011; Engers and McManus 2007;
Rosenkranz and Schmitz 2007).
In the recent history of spectrum auctions researchers observed various types of
imperfect outcomes both because of the methods used (the actual design of the pro-
cess) as well as the understanding of the context. Common methodological oversights
include the oversupply of licenses compared to the local market needs (Swiss and Ital-
ian 3G auctions, 2000),3 the lack of adequate provisions to prevent strategic bidding
or collusion among operators (tacit or otherwise, including cases of bid signaling in
FCC auctions; Cramton and Schwartz 2002; Bajari and Yeo 2009) and high reserve
1 In a given region or country.
2 http://econ.ohio-state.edu/seminar/papers/120831_TBA.pdf.
3 This can be attributed to one operator pulling out before the auction or not participating at all.
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prices for single or packaged lots that end up unsold (Indian auction 2016, for 700,
900 MHz and 2.4 GHz).4 An auction may result in suboptimal social returns in other
cases, for example when investments are delayed or cancelled due to high—instead
of low—prices paid. Typical examples are the UK5 and German 3G auctions in the
early 2000s where operators paid orders of magnitude more than other operators in
similar socioeconomic contexts (Klemperer 2002b). Some argue that elevated costs of
entry in mobile services may have an impact on investment for coverage and quality
of connections, and lead to higher prices and subsequently lower adoption rates. As
we show in Sect. 4 this assertion has often been disputed.
The simple question “are auctions socially optimal allocation processes compared
to other mechanisms like structured negotiations or beauty contests?” may be hard
to answer if other parameters are not taken into account. For example, a competitive
mechanism can not directly induce a specific type of behavior to participants but
may only provide a framework within which they will be expected to navigate. This
oversight is also found in the literature of government security sales where the key
aspects that affect an auction’s results are market thickness—the guarantee that there
is a large pool of bidders for the auctioned lots—and low entry costs (Klemperer
2002a). Across a range of experiments with different auction designs there are largely
inconclusive results6 regarding external to the design parameters, particularly with
the issue of market power as an impediment to efficient outcomes. Other exogenous
parameters like the structural imperfections related to market power (like a dominant
position or the participation of a new entrant) may also affect the final outcomes
(Morey 2001).
In this paper we look into the impact of auction design on final prices paid—con-
trolling for many aspects of the context and structure we described. Our focus is the
mobile communications market where spectrum auctions have gradually displaced
beauty contests as the primary mechanism for assigning high value spectrum. Such
auctions combine complexity with far-reaching economic impacts, and have stimu-
lated many of the theoretical developments in the past decade. As a result of this
activity we now have records of hundreds of spectrum auctions throughout the world.
This makes it possible to address empirical questions about spectrum auction design
and auction outcomes. This is a first attempt—to our knowledge—of this kind. We
address two key questions: First whether auction design influences the outcome in
terms of revenue derived, measured by a standard nominal metric of $ per MHz per
unit of population (in the coverage area). And second whether the amount paid for
spectrum by an operator is linked to that operator’s legacy spectrum holdings.
To address these questions we use a micro-dataset of more than 10,000 lots cover-
ing 85 countries and 371 auctions for the period 1994–2015. We find that any auction
design is preferable to administrative awards, first come/first serve awards and beauty
contests in terms of the normalized returns. This possibility suggests that auctions are
better suited to infer true valuations for scarce resources compared to less rigid or
4 This ended with only 10% of the envisaged revenues due to very high reserve prices by the regulator.
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/727831.stm.
6 See Simon (1994); Malvey et al. (1996); Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996); Reinhart and Belzer (1996);
Ausubel and Cramton (1998).
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transparent processes. Apart from the overall format some specific components of the
design have a significant impact on the final price paid. These include the pricing rules
(core pricing, “pay as bid”, “highest loser”, etc.), the flexibility to choose among com-
binations of lots (packaged bids) and the switching of spectrum blocks before the final
allocation. The leading combinations in terms of the normalized returns are SMRA
auctions with augmented switching and the CCA with core pricing. There is sub-
stantial heterogeneity across regional and national licenses while local socioeconomic
conditions help explain a substantial proportion of the residual effects.
We further look into the market power across regions and its link to the final prices
paid. We reconstruct the panel to account for all mergers and acquisitions in the
telecommunications industry over the past decades and test the importance of an
operator’s customer base, its status as incumbent or entrant and the local regulations
concerning dominant firms. Our results show that structural imperfections in local
markets combined with local regulations have a major impact on normalized returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and econo-
metric approach. Section 3 describes the types of spectrum auction, Sect. 4 gives our
answer to the first question above, together with a brief attempt to set it in the broader
context of spectrum management. Section 5 addresses the second question in a similar
framework. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Types of spectrum auctions
In this section we describe the key auction designs that have been used for spectrum and
the rationale behind each of their designs. Often the experience from previous auctions
lead regulators and governments to try various rules and provisions that help prevent
collusion among participants, motivate truthful bidding, guarantee service provision
after the end of the process and eventually increase social—rather than private—re-
turns. This subtle trade-off between auction participants whose bidding strategies often
aim to maximize profits, strengthen their position in the regulated market and effec-
tively face lower competitive pressure needs to be balanced with the maximization of
social returns that government and regulators—in most cases—seek to achieve. Some
simple designs without specific provisions for these conflicting interests have been
exploited in the past in various occasions (Klemperer and Pagnozzi 2002).
Before we introduce the various designs we try to sketch the overall process from
the announcement of the auction until the grant of the licenses. A regulator (and
less often a ministry or government) announces the auction of one or more spectrum
lots in certain frequency bands (1800, 2600 MHz, etc.). Each of the lots has a fixed
bandwidth (5, 10 MHz, etc.) that can be paired (2×5 MHz) or unpaired (single 5 MHz
lot) with another part in the same frequency band. For example, in 2014 Ofcom (the
UK regulator) auctioned 4 lots of 2×5 MHz (paired) in the 800 MHz band, 1 lot of
2×10 MHz in the same band (with universal service obligations) along with 9 lots
of 5 MHz (unpaired) in the 2600 MHz band and 14 lots of 2×5 MHz (paired) in
the same band (Ofcom, 2014). The firms wishing to enter the auction had to qualify
for participation and register. Conditional on previous ownership they may bid for
some or all of the lots. Regulators in order to achieve a level playing field often set
123
Auction design and auction outcomes 279
aside some lots for entrants or firms that have limited (or no) spectrum holdings to
compete with other players. Thus the envisaged “balance” in the competitive landscape
is prioritised at the expense of a process that could yield additional public revenues
but would likely decrease competition in the market and possibly the social returns of
mobile communications.
Before getting to the discussion of the various designs it is important to note that not
all bands have the same value for commercial and other frequencies. In the commercial
mobile communications (2G, 3G, 4G) lower frequency bands are more valuable for
operators as these can better penetrate building walls compared to higher frequencies.
The higher frequencies (2600 MHz) can not reach the building interiors so well but
can instead offer more capacity which is essential for higher throughput rates. The
1800 MHz band (or 1900 MHz in some areas) offers a compromise between these two
cases but the overall mix of existing spectrum ownership, the density of cell towers,
the local geography and the selection of lots auctioned allow operators to shape their
bidding strategies and assess their relative importance for service delivery. For clarity,
in our analysis the commercial lots include the following frequencies: 800, 900, 1800,
1900, 2100 and 2600 MHz.
2.1 Simultaneous multiple round auction (SMRA)
The most typical auction design (used in various settings like in fine art and treasury
bills) is the ascending auction where all participants bid for the same object until the
highest bidder wins (often named as English auction). The auction continues until there
is no more bidding for an object. The SMRA is an ascending auction for multiple lots
that are included in the process and runs simultaneously for all of them. In this case
after the end of each round the participants re-evaluate their strategies conditional on
the bidding of other participants. When there is no additional demand for any of the
lots the allocation process begins. In some cases the bidding process does not involve
specific lots but generic ones. Operators interested in the 2600 MHz band for a lot
would not bid for a specific lot (whose frequency ranged would be fixed) but a generic
lot in that entire auctioned band. During the allocation process these generic lots are
distributed (according to preferences or further bidding) to the interested parties.
While this design is relatively straightforward for participants it has been observed
that bidders may face a “lot aggregation” risk while trying to safeguard their preferred
parts. For this purpose, some additional rules have been used including the ability to
switch lots with other bidders (switching rule). Staged bidding for the allocation of
generic lots can also partly alleviate the aggregation risk. Other rules like caps in the
maximum number of lots acquired (or frequency) and set-asides have also been used
with the aim to improve the competitive landscape.
2.2 Sealed bid auction
This is a single round auction where participants submit their bids in a sealed enve-
lope (or another secretive manner). Since there is no further bidding lot winners are
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determined after the bid submission. There are two ways to determine prices paid:
with first price or pay as bid auctions where participants pay for the amount they
actually bid; or with second price bid comparison where they pay the second highest
bidders price (this can be the lowest winner’s bid or highest loser’s). More recently
this process has been changed to include generic lot bidding and combinatorial or
packaged bidding allowing participants to bid for combinations of existing lots rather
than single lots. In sealed bid auctions the simplicity of a single round comes at
the expense of price discovery from participants. Given that there is only one round
available, participants can not elicit other parties’ interests hence reducing their price
discovery capacity. However, in some cases this process allows wider participation as
it increases uncertainty for incumbents and creates opportunity for entry. The intro-
duction of packaged bids (combinatorial sealed bid auctions) and multiple attributes
for bids (coverage obligations along with price) has led to bids ranked by score instead
of price alone.
2.3 Combinatorial clock auction
More recently the various limitations associated with the SMRA design (for example in
the early 2000s for the 3G UK and German auctions) and other simpler clock auctions
has led several regulators to adopt a different multi round format. This design is often
implemented with generic lots allowing for combinations of lots too. The bidding
process starts with an ascending clock for each category. This initial ascending clock
phase, during which bidders state their demands in response to the current prices is
followed by sealed bid second price rule for package bids. In the allocation phase the
regulator computes the highest value allocation and the corresponding payments. In
this stage (Ausubel et al. 2006) the final prices are adjusted so that they are within the
“core” pricing area. These are referred to as Core Pricing designs for combinatorial
clock auctions.7 This design eliminates aggregation risks posed by SMRA and drives
participants to engage in truthful bidding strategies. At the same time, it can cope with
combinations of lots across bands and allows for specific spectrum floors and other
auction specific rules. On the downside CCA is more complex that the other key designs
and the final prices paid may differ from actual bids (Levin and Skrzypacz 2016).
Other types of auction designs include the English auction (open outcry ascending
bid auction), the Dutch auction (descending auction until someone accepts the current
price or the reserve price is reached), the Beauty Contests with or without a financial bid
criterion (a mechanism without specific allocation rule, i.e., highest price bidder wins,
but a combination of parameters that may include the speed of delivery, the reputation
of the bidder, etc.), Standard Clock auctions (without package bids or core pricing)
and First Come First Served auctions (where all incoming bids are considered and
the lots can be sold at any given time with or without specific criteria). Other designs
include the Anglo Dutch auctions where a first round of ascending bidding is followed
7 CCA designs can have several variations in terms of the first stage combinations and second stage
allocations. For example, allocation can come with second prices or core pricing rules.
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by a second round of descending prices. In this case the highest bidder gets a cash
premium irrespective of the outcome of the second round (van Bochove et al. 2012).
Other parameters that often affect bidding strategies and form allocation are the
levels of reserve prices for each lot—and the willingness to safeguard that these will
be kept in any possible outcome (i.e., in case no participant meets them, see for example
the auction in Medudula et al. 2016).
3 Data and econometric approach
The dataset used in this study is a thorough collection of spectrum auctions in the
past two decades. It includes 85 countries over 1994–2015 and 13,059 lots from 41
frequency bands. The data come from the DotEcon database8 and manual collection
by the authors. A full description of the variables can be found in Table 5 of the
“Appendix” and an indicative breakdown of normalized prices per country and year
in Fig. 5. For a full list of the frequency bands included in our sample see Table 6.
In this paper we deal with all types of auctions that have been used in the past 20 years
for spectrum allocation around the world. This includes the categories mentioned in
Sect. 2 and the specific rules that accompanied them. We particularly control for the
existence of package bids or switching of lots along with pricing rules (first, second,
second—highest loser and second—lowest winner). Further to the auction design
our data includes information about the number of rounds that each auction took to
complete, the days that this process lasted, the population coverage objectives for
each lot, the local population density,9 the level of mobile adoption in each area, the
duration of each license, the size in MHz of each lot, whether the lot was paired or
not, the number of bidders for each lot, the number of licenses for each frequency,
the income levels in each area and whether these lots were allocated for national or
regional coverage. Moreover, we add country controls and year effects to account for
various country and year specific shocks that may confound the underlying process.
Last we also control for the impact of different frequency bands in the price paid for
each lot with a full set of frequency band controls.
Having described our control variables, we discuss the limitations of our data. In
particular, we have no information about the existence of set-asides or caps that may
have been imposed in various settings. To alleviate this omission, we use information
about the number of bidders for each lot and whether an entrant takes part in this
bidding. From this we flag as possible set-asides the lots that have only (one or more)
entrant bidders. This may not be fully consistent as some lots may attract entrants only
but it is the closest we can get to infer this information with the given data. We also run
regressions at the auction level (instead of the lot level) to make sure that each auction
design is given its merit without an observation bias that favours regional auctions
with multiple lots.
To compare different auction outcomes, we use a normalized metric of the final
prices paid. This is computed as the natural logarithm of the price of a lot divided by
8 A leading consultancy firm.
9 This is at the country level only.
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Fig. 1 Normalized returns ($/MHz/pop) and generic auction format
size of the spectrum (in MHz) and the population covered ($/MHz/pop). To avoid a
bias toward auctions with more lots included than others, like the US regional auctions,
we average the normalized price paid for lots of the same frequency and region (for
regional only auctions). Therefore the analysis—in most parts—is not based at the lot
level but at the frequency band level by auction and region.10
In our analysis we compare different auction designs, pricing and other rules based
on this normalized metric. Figure 1 compares the generic auction formats and shows
that SMRA-like and multi-round clock-like auctions designs often return higher nor-
malized revenues. We further show (Fig. 3) that packaged bids have higher chances of
increasing the final prices paid (normalized) and also that not allowing block switching
will lead to similar outcomes (Fig. 4).
Our empirical specification models the normalized (log) of average prices price11
of a lot k for each auction, frequency band and sub-national region (i.e., the price per
MHz and population covered) sold at a country i at time t as a function of the auction
10 Results at the lot level have been computed and are available upon request.
11 In our analysis we do not use reserve prices as a dependent variable. The reason is that we are primarily
interested in the final prices paid for allocated spectrum and (high) reserve prices often lead to an auction
cancelation, lots being unsold and lower revenues. If these are below the true valuation of bidders or the
prices they are willing to pay through other motives (collusion, foreclosure), reserve prices should not drive
outcomes over and above our set of existing controls.
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specific parameters as well as a range of local competition and regional socio-economic
conditions. Our baseline empirical specification is:
log (Pikt ) 
4∑
j1
D jikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (1)
where D jikt is the auction format [SMRA-like, Clock-like, Sealed bid, other], pricing
rule, and auction description. Xit is a vector of lot and locational and economic char-
acteristics. ϕi is a dummy variable to control for unobserved time-invariant country
effects and ψt is a dummy variable for unobserved year effects. In order to increase the
granularity of the auction designs we further look into eight award class descriptions12:
log (Pikt ) 
12∑
m1
Dmikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (2)
The static nature of models (1) and (2) may overshadow other structural effects
that play a critical role in lot allocation and pricing. For example, the ownership of
previous spectrum holdings may have a significant effect on this relationship. Sim-
ilarly, the range of spectrum holdings (in various frequency bands) and the level of
these investments (in MHz) may also be crucial for our analysis. For this, we also
embark on a dynamic analysis to assess how previous ownership and operator status
(incumbent/entrant) influence the final prices paid that we observe. For this purpose,
we look at each country’s auctions and add the frequencies held by each operator. This
is a complex process as operators often merge or acquire others, buy and sell spectrum
between auctions or even change their names across different award processes.13 This
analysis uses the lot level prices paid as the average prices would not allow us to
control for the operator level effects (entry and previous ownership) explicitly.
In this process we introduce three new metrics: Entranti j t is a binary variable for
operators (denoted by j, in country i at time t) that have no ownership of spectrum,
Si j t is the % ownership of any spectrum in the previous period and Stoti j t the average
% spectrum ownership in all previous periods. We also add a control variable for sub
1 GHz frequencies Lk . This is based on all (measured in MHz) spectrum held from
any previous auction and the fraction each operator won. Si j t and Stoti j t take values
from 0 to 1. With these changes Eq. (2) now becomes:
log
(
Pi jkt
)  Entranti j t + Lk +
12∑
m1
Dmikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (3)
12 Award class descriptions include: First come first serve, Beauty contest, Beauty contest with financial bid
criterion, Auction-unknown, Auction-other, One-shop sealed bid auction, Standard clock auction, Standard
SMRA auction, Standard SMRA auction with augmented switching, Standard CCA with core pricing and
Unknown.
13 Operators can change names, merge (within countries) or become part of another group. Therefore there
is a temporal evolution of operators and groups, i.e., Panafon Greece becomes Vodafone in 2001 (part of
Vodafone group). This means that Panafon as an operator remains the same (same id) but group changes
from sole company (Panafon_id) to group (Vodafone group).
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Introducing the memory component it becomes:
log
(
Pi jkt
)  Si j t + Lk +
12∑
m1
Dmikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (4)
And with full memory it becomes:
log
(
Pi jkt
)  Stoti j t + Lk +
12∑
m1
Dmikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (5)
To capture the actual dynamics of the % ownership we add the first and second
order polynomial terms of the full memory, so that it becomes14:
log
(
Pi jkt
) 
2∑
f 1
(
Stoti j t
) f
+ Lk +
12∑
m1
Dmikt + Xikt + ϕi + ψt + ikt , (6)
Bands for popular technologies (2G, 3G, 4G) are often more expensive compared
to other spectrum parts. For this on top of the frequency band controls already included
we present the findings of this analysis for each cluster separately (for 2G, 3G and 4G
and then for all other frequencies).
4 Auction design and spectrum auction revenues
One of the long-lasting controversial issues in spectrum management is whether high
prices in spectrum auctions have adverse repercussions in communications markets.
To put it in a more challenging way, ‘Are spectrum auctions ruining our grandchildren’s
future?’ (Cave and Valletti 2000). A major matter of dispute is the extent to which
spectrum prices are a sunk cost, so that while expectations of revenues and costs
influence bidding in an auction, prices actually paid in that auction have no impact on
the subsequent pricing of the spectrum-using service.
The industry association (GSMA) supports that high spectrum prices have a negative
impact on consumers as the added costs are passed through higher prices. For this
GSMA argues that government efforts to maximise revenues from spectrum auctions
can damage the wider economy (GSMA 2017, p. 3). On the other hand, Cambini
and Garelli (2017, p. 2) conclude on the basis of an empirical investigation using a
dataset of firms in 24 countries over 10 years that (spectrum) availability and fees seem
uncorrelated with mobile operators’ revenues, This suggests that spectrum prices do
not significantly affect industry performance supporting the ‘sunk costs’ hypothesis.
The first empirical question to be investigated is whether different auction designs
do or do not generate systematically different prices. On the combined assumption
of sunk costs and bidder rationality (no winner’s curse), there would appear to be no
necessary problem with using a design, which raised more cash for the government.
For those taking the opposite view, higher prices would entail adverse consequences.
14 We tested with polynomials of 4th order finding similar estimates. Since the simpler specification resulted
in similar accuracy we followed the 2nd order approach.
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The median price in the regional lots is 0.124 $/MHz/person and for the national lots
0.151 $/MHz/person. Using these we anchor our analysis and interpret the estimated
coefficients as deviations from these median prices. In the case of regional and national
lots (Table 1) we find that the “Pay as Bid” pricing rule has a strongly positive and
significant effect on the normalized returns of a national auction resulting in 0.059
$/MHz/pop compared to other pricing rules as expected. In regional auctions the
second price—highest loser pricing yields 0.086 $/MHz/pop when used. Looking
into auction formats (columns 3 and 4) we find that SMRA designs return 0.044
$/MHz/pop and 0.066 $/MHz/pop for regional and national lots respectively while
sealed bid auctions increase normalized returns in national lots by 0.069 $/MHz/pop.
The rules about packaged bids and switching after the bidding process (columns 5
and 6) are also important. The flexibility to avoid lock-ins in a specific lot results in
0.067 $/MHz/pop and 0.053 $/MHz/pop in regional and national auctions while the
packaged bids yield 0.031 $/MHz/pop in regional auctions.
To further understand the link between auction formats and outcomes we break
down the auction formats in the three previous categories (SMRA, clock and sealed
bid) into 8 award classes while controlling for pricing rules as well as packaged bids and
switching. These are shown in Table 2 for all licenses and national licenses separately
(columns 1 and 2).
Overall the results across regional and national lots seem to be aligned in spite
of the differences that characterize regional and national lots for operators and their
bidding strategies. We find that in the regional lots case (column 1, Table 2) the SMRA
design with augmented switching results in the highest normalized returns with 0.549
$/MHz/pop followed by CCA with core pricing with 0.206 $/MHz/pop. In this case the
option for switching is an important signal to participants. Given that a lock in can be
avoided they seem to value this option and continue with their true valuation of the lots
until the bidding is completed. Standard clock auctions report slightly lower results
compared to CCA and they both represent improvements over the standard SMRA
design that yields 0.133 $/MHz/pop. Much lower in the list we find the sealed bid
auctions and First Come First Served ones which are both significant improvements
over Beauty contests with or without financial bid criteria.
In the national lots case (column 2, Table 2) we find that three auction designs
are very close to each other, namely the CCA with core pricing, the SMRA with
augmented switching and the Standard clock auctions. Among them the CCA with
core pricing results in the highest returns with 0.339 $/MHz/pop while the other two
types have more than 10% lower normalized outcomes. The standard SMRA design
is also high in the list with 0.203 $/MHz/pop but clearly far from uncovering the true
valuations compared to more recent designs.
Overall the SMRA with augmented switching and the CCA with core pricing appear
to be highly improved designs in terms of the returns they can yield for governments.
Understanding the valuations of participants and encouraging truthful bidding is a
prerequisite for a good design. However other structural and competitive parameters
may interfere in this relationship. Since we are mainly looking at the prices paid we can
not directly assess whether these higher returns result in a more competitive market. In
Sect. 5 we discuss these aspects of market entry, concentration and bidding behaviour.
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Table 2 Award class descriptions and rules linked to final prices for national and regional licenses
Variables (1) (2)
log of price USD/MHz/pop log of price USD/MHz/pop
All licenses National only
Award class description
CCA with core pricing 0.978*** (0.327) 1.177* (0.599)
SMRA 0.728*** (0.137) 0.851** (0.328)
SMRA with augmented switching 1.691*** (0.275) 1.038** (0.454)
Standard clock 0.873*** (0.212) 1.057*** (0.377)
Sealed bid 0.317*** (0.115) 0.511 (0.315)
Beauty contest with financial bid
criterion
0.0841 (0.113) 0.0564 (0.303)
First Come First Serve 0.355*** (0.129) -0.247 (0.398)
Beauty contest without financial bid
criterion
0.0975 (0.136) 0.0380 (0.399)
Controls (with pricing rules and
switching)
Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Frequency FE Yes Yes
Observations 5573 183
R-squared 0.522 0.917
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5 Spectrum prices and ownership
A firm’s bidding behavior in a given spectrum award may be influenced both by
history, including its own legacy spectrum holdings, and by its expectations of the
future concerning either the development of the market place in which it operates or
the expected future pattern of spectrum awards or both. This section is concerned with
the impact on bidding of a firm’s current holdings, defined by the bands in which the
licenses are located, the unexpired period of the relevant licenses and their expectations
of the renewal procedure.
In the proposed framework, firms are often assumed to have two types of motive:
• Cost minimization or efficiency: this sees the firm’s demand for its overall access
to spectrum as derived from its expectation of its customers’ demand for services.
The demand for the spectrum in any awards thus depends on its expectation of
the overall growth of the relevant downstream markets, its expected share of those
markets, its existing endowments of spectrum, the auction price, and other factors
such as its access to capital to acquire licenses.
• In the case of dominant firms, a foreclosure motive. This is the phrase used by the
US Department of Justice (2014) to describe a particular form of strategic behavior
in spectrum markets—the desire of predominantly large firms to push up the prices
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which its rivals pay for spectrum. A firm may pursue this strategy of raising its
rivals’ costs even if its own costs rise.
The former ‘efficiency’ motive will make firms’ relative willingness to pay for spec-
trum in an auction depend on where they currently stand in relation to what they
perceive to be the efficient combination of inputs into the production process (includ-
ing in particular, the efficient combination of spectrum holdings and base stations)
over the expected lifetime of the award (taking into account expectations of future
awards).
A very crude index of operators’ relative shortage of spectrum at the moment of an
award is to compare their ratios of spectrum holdings to traffic carried, or—even more
crudely—number of subscribers. This metric has a number of obvious difficulties,
including the problem of aggregating spectrum holdings in different bands. But it also
leaves out expectations. For example, if it is expected the market concentration will
increase, then larger operators may expect a greater shortfall than smaller ones (other
things equal) and this might ‘explain’ a positive correlation between willingness to
pay in an auction and existing spectrum holdings.
In these circumstances we do not seek to investigate the motives underlying bid-
ding behavior but to investigate whether there is evidence that the size of a firm’s
legacy holdings influences its auction bids. Building on Eqs. (3)–(6) we present our
findings in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows our first finding, that entrants systemati-
cally pay more if set-asides are not in place using normalized prices, i.e., for the same
amount of spectrum compared to established players. The effect is relatively high at
0.079 $/MHz/pop for all frequencies in regional lots and rises to 0.310 $/MHz/pop
for national and commercial lots. This effect is surprising given that there is vast het-
erogeneity in prices paid within auctions. In fact, the effect appears to be as high as
the differences across auction designs—namely the CCA with core pricing in national
auctions versus the other designs. Looking at frequency related valuations we observe
that the prices for commercial lots in national auctions are 0.034 $/MHz/pop higher
compared to other bands. In the other cases statistical significance is low to provide
some further insights.
In Table 4 we introduce the historic ownership of spectrum into the regression
framework. In this case we depart from the average prices per frequency band used
in previous tables as the effects we are interested to capture relate to each operator
separately (and the lots they acquired). Therefore, this analysis is performed at the lot
level for regional and national auctions. To illustrate the effect, calculations based on
Table 4 show that an operator that was awarded 30% of the spectrum auctioned in a
previous competition is expected to pay 0.008 $/MHz/pop in the next auction. Looking
into the full history of auctions—that may include non commercial licenses and other
types of spectrum—we find that the effect remains strong but drops substantially. We
further seek to understand whether this relationship is linear and for this we add a
quadratic term for the spectrum ownership variable. The results for the quadratic term
suggest that there is a maximum of spectrum ownership beyond which operators stop
imposing further increases of the nominal prices paid (inverted u-curve). This helps
explain why in established markets entrants (with zero spectrum holdings as shown
in Table 3) and smaller players (less than 35% of spectrum) appear to pay more.
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Table 3 Entry, sub 1 GHz and award class descriptions linked to final prices for national and regional
licenses
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
All frequencies All frequencies Commercial
frequencies
(2G/3G/4G)
Commercial
frequencies
(2G/3G/4G)
log of price
USD/MHz/pop
log of price
USD/MHz/pop
log of price
USD/MHz/pop
log of price
USD/MHz/pop
All licenses National only All licenses National only
Entrant (no previous
ownership of spectrum)
0.491* (0.258) 0.896* (0.470) 0.596** (0.298) 1.116*** (0.334)
Auctions for
spectrum < 1 GHz
0.192 (0.333) 0.302 (0.306) 0.156 (0.341) 0.203* (0.116)
Controls (including auction
design, package bids,
switching)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Frequency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5.573 183 3.082 135
R-squared 0.522 0.925 0.524 0.942
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
This happens up until a player becomes ‘established’ and reaches the 35% spectrum
ownership. From that point on operators tend to pay less in normalized terms. Testing
with higher level polynomials confirms this observation.
In order to further analyze the relationship between spectrum ownership (in the
previous round) and bidding behavior, we split the countries in two groups: the first
one does not have any market-power related regulations on significant market power
(SMP, source: ITU ICT eye); the second has explicit market-power regulations. We
re-ran the models in Table 4 and plot the resulting u-shaped curves in Fig. 2. The
results suggest that in cases where market power restrictions exist—or specific caps
are in place—operators restrict (voluntarily or not) their acquisition of lots, possibly
to a level that prevents any sanctions. The situation is different in countries or regions
without such restrictions. One possible interpretation of this is that in the absence of
SMP restrictions on operators, the likelihood of foreclosure is increasing in the percent
of spectrum ownership of each operator.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the impact of auction design on final prices paid using a
broad dataset of thousands of lots awarded over the period 1994–2015. We identify
the key designs that result in the highest returns (SMRA with augmented switching
and CCA with core pricing). We further look into the importance of structural market
dynamics using the percent of spectrum awarded to each operator in the previous
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Fig. 2 SMP regulations and bidding behavior. The dashed line is the local maximum for cases where SMP
covers market shares
round(s). We find a link between ownership and price paid. A past history of success
in spectrum awards has a positive effect on prices paid subsequently up to a certain
level and conditional on local rules around market concentration. It is possible that
the manner in which this effect operates may depend upon local regulations, as our
analysis indicates.
This study is a first step in the empirical analysis of auction outcomes at a global
scale. We believe that future research based on more granular auction data can shed
light not only on auction processes but also on the link between final prices paid in
auctions and subsequent market outcomes, such as competitive structures, average
revenues per capita, coverage, and new technology adoption levels.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Tables 5, 6 and Figs. 3, 4 and 5.
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Table 5 Description of the variables in our sample
Field Description
Award id Unique identifier for each award
Award name Name of the award
Country Country the award was held in
Format Award format, e.g. SMRA, CCA, beauty contest
Date The end date of the award
Number of bidders The number of participating bidders in the auction.
Number of MNOs The number of active MNOs in the country at the time of
the award (not including MVNOs)
Available spectrum (MHz) The total amount of spectrum available in the award (should
be paired plus unpaired)
Available spectrum (paired, MHz) The amount of paired spectrum available in the award
Available spectrum (unpaired, MHz) The total amount of unpaired spectrum available in the
award
Lotid Unique identifier for each lots (or, in the case where
lot-by-lot data could not be recorded, each winner’s
winning package)
Licence duration The term of the licence in years. This can be expressed as a
decimal to reflect non-whole years.
Winner The name of the winner of the licence.
Frequency band Frequency band corresponding to the licence, e.g., 800, 900,
1800, 2100 MHz, and 2.6 GHz etc.
Region The region corresponding to the licence
Population covered The estimated population covered by the licence
Size (MHz) Total amount of spectrum in MHz of the licence (paired
plus unpaired spectrum)
Paired (MHz) Total amount of paired spectrum in MHz of the licence
Unpaired (MHz) Total amount of unpaired spectrum in MHz of the licence
Lot price Licence price for the lot awarded. This is the ‘headline’
price in local currency and does not include any annual
fees over the term of the licence plus any other fees e.g.,
administrative fees
Package price Licence price for a package, where it is not possible to split
this by lot (e.g. combinatorial auction). This is the
‘headline’ price in local currency and does not include
any annual fees over the term of the licence plus any other
fees e.g., administrative fees
Lot reserve price The reserve price for the lot awarded. This is in local
currency and does not include any annual fees over the
term of the licence plus any other fees e.g., administrative
fees
Package reserve price The reserve price for a package (where applicable). This is
in local currency and does not include any annual fees
over the term of the licence plus any other fees e.g.,
administrative fees
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Table 5 continued
Field Description
Payment year The payment year to which the amounts in the following
two columns refer two. Year 0 represents upfront
payments.
Amount due The total estimated payment amount that is due in this
payment year for the corresponding lot/package
Annualfee The component of the ‘amount due’ that reflects annual
fees, as opposed to the licence fee established in the
award process
Country area (Sq Km) The land area of the country in sq km
Continent North America (NA), South America (SA), Oceania (O),
Asia (A), Africa (AF) or Europe (E)
MajorGeoRegion Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Southern
Africa, Western Africa, Caribbean, Central America,
South America, Northern America, Central Asia, Eastern
Asia, SouthernAsia, South-East Asia, Western Asia,
Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe,
Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia,
Micronesia, Polynesia
Currency The local currency at the time of the award
PPP rate (local currency to USD) Purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor is the
number of units of a country’s currency required to buy
the same amount of goods and services in the domestic
market that a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States.
The reported rate is based on GDP and corresponds to the
year of the award
popDensity Population density in specified year
urbanPop Population living in urban areas as defined by national
statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank
population estimates and urban ratios from the United
Nations World Urbanization Prospects
GDPLocalCurrencyReal GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources
GDPLocalCurrencyNominal The nominal term is based on current prices in local
currency, i.e., not inflation adjusted
GNILocalCurrencyReal The real term has been adjusted for inflation using the GDP
deflator which is based in different years for different
countries
GNILocalCurrencyNominal GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies)
not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of
primary income (compensation of employees and
property income) from abroad. This data is in local
currency, real versus nominal as per GDP terms above
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Table 5 continued
Field Description
gini Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of
income or consumption expenditure among individuals or
households within an economy deviates from a perfectly
equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative
percentages of total income received against the
cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest
individual or household. The Gini index measures the area
between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of
absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the
maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies
perfect inequality
inflationConsumerPricesPercent Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that
may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as
yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used
inflationGDPDeflatorPercent Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP
implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the
economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the
ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant
local currency
telephonemainlines Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a
subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched
telephone network and that have a port on a telephone
exchange. Integrated services digital network channels
ands fixed wireless subscribers are included
mobilesubscribers The number of mobile subscribers
fixedBroadbandSubscribers Fixed broadband Internet subscribers are the number of
broadband subscribers with a digital subscriber line, cable
modem, or other high-speed technology
Table 6 A2 Frequencies of lots
included in our sample Frequency bands
10 GHz 3.4–3.5 GHz 1600 MHz 800 MHz
11 GHz 3.4–3.6 GHz 1700 MHz 850 MHz
2.1 GHz 3.4–3.8 GHz 1800 MHz 870 MHz
2.3 GHz 3.5 GHz 1900 MHz 900 MHz
2.5 GHz 3.6 GHz 400 MHz
2.6 GHz 3.6–3.8 GHz 410 MHz
23 GHz 31 GHz 420 MHz
24 GHz 32 GHz 450 MHz
26 GHz 38 GHz 450–470 MHz
26–27 GHz 40 GHz 500 MHz
28 GHz 1450 MHz 678–686 MHz
3.4 GHz 1500 MHz 700 MHz
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Fig. 3 Normalized returns ($/MHz/pop) and use of packaged bids
Fig. 4 Normalized returns ($/MHz/pop) and spectrum block switching
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Fig. 5 Prices per lot by country and year (Note only countries with more than 50 observations or more are
reported)
References
Ausubel, L. M., & Cramton, P. (1998). Auctioning securities. University of Maryland Working Paper.
Bajari, P., & Yeo, J. (2009). Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions. Information
Economics and Policy, 21(2), 90–100.
Binmore, K., & Klemperer, P. (2002). The biggest auction ever: The sale of the British 3G telecom licences.
The Economic Journal, 112(478), 74–96.
Cambini, C., & Garelli, N. (2017). Spectrum fees and market performance: A quantitative analysis. Telecom-
munications Policy. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S03085961173005
63.
Cave, M., & Valletti, T. (2000). Are spectrum auctions ruining our grandchildren’s future? Info, 2(4),
347–350.
Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I. (1998). Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 65(1), 1–21.
Chen, B. R., & Chiu, Y. S. (2011). Competitive bidding with a bid floor. International Journal of Economic
Theory, 7(4), 351–371.
Cramton, P. (2013). Spectrum auction design. Review of Industrial Organization, 42(2), 161–190.
Cramton, P., & Schwartz, J. A. (2002). Collusive bidding in the FCC spectrum auctions. Contributions in
Economic Analysis & Policy, 1(1), 1–18.
Engers, M., & McManus, B. (2007). Charity auctions. International Economic Review, 48(3), 953–994.
Gavious, A., Benny, M., & Sela, A. (2002). Bid costs and endogenous bid caps. RAND Journal of Economics,
33, 709–722.
Jehiel, P. (2011). Manipulative auction design. Theoretical Economics, 6(2), 185–217.
Klemperer, P. (1999). Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3),
227–286.
Klemperer, P. (2002a). What really matters in auction design. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1),
169–189.
123
Auction design and auction outcomes 297
Klemperer, P. (2002b). Some observations on the British and German 3G telecom auctions.
Klemperer, P., & Pagnozzi, M. (2002). Advantaged bidders and spectrum prices: An empirical analysis.
Working paper, Nuffield college, Oxford University.
Levin, J., & Skrzypacz, A. (2016). Properties of the combinatorial clock auction. American Economic
Review, 106(9), 2528–2551.
Medudula, M. K., Sagar, M., & Gandhi, R. P. (2016). Telecom management in emerging economies. New
Delhi: Springer.
Morey, M. (2001). Ensuring sufficient generation capacity during the transition to competitive electricity
markets. Edison Electric Institute: www.eei.org.
Nyborg, K. G., & Sundaresan, S. (1996). Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from
when-issued transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(1), 63–104.
Reinhart, V., & Belzer, G. (1996). Some evidence on bid shading and the use of information in the US
treasury’s auction experiment. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Roider, A., & Schmitz, P. W. (2012). Auctions with anticipated emotions: Overbidding, underbidding, and
optimal reserve prices. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(3), 808–830.
Rosenkranz, S., & Schmitz, P. W. (2007). Reserve prices in auctions as reference points. The Economic
Journal, 117(520), 637–653.
Salant, D. J. (2014). Auction design, management, and strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
van Bochove, C., Boerner, L., & Quint, D. (2012). Anglo-Dutch premium auctions in eighteenth-century
Amsterdam (No. 2012/3). School of Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics.
123
